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In this paper we present a simple, theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic
efficiency associated with business fluctuations. We decompose this indicator, which we refer to as “the
gap”, into two constituent parts: a price markup and a wage markup, and show that the latter accounts for
the bulk of the fluctuations in our gap measure. Finally, we derive a measure of the welfare costs of
business cycles that is directly related to our gap variable, and which takes into account explicitly the
existence of a varying aggregate inefficiency. When applied to postwar U.S. data, for plausible
parametrizations, our measure suggests welfare losses of fluctuations that are of a higher order of
magnitude than those derived by Lucas (1987). It also suggests that the major postwar recessions involved
substantial efficiency costs.
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To the extent that there exist price and wage rigidities, or possibly other types of
market frictions, the business cycle is likely to involve ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in the
allocation of resources. Speciﬁcally, the economy may oscillate between expansionary
periods when the volume of economic activity is close to the social optimum, and
recessions that feature a signiﬁcant drop in production relative to the ﬁrst best. In
this paper we explore this hypothesis by developing a simple measure of aggregate
ineﬃciency and examining its cyclical properties. The measure we propose - which we
call “the ineﬃciency gap” or “the gap”, for short - is based on the size of the wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Deviations of this gap from zero reﬂect an ineﬃcient allo-
cation of employment. By constructing a time series measure of the ineﬃciency gap,
we are able to obtain some insight into both the nature and welfare costs of business
cycles.
From a somewhat diﬀerent perspective, we show that the ineﬃciency gap corre-
sponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost. Procyclical
movements in the ineﬃciency gap accordingly mirror countercyclical movements in
this markup. Our approach, however, diﬀers from much of the recent literature on
business cycles and markups by using the household’s marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure to measure the price of labor, as opposed to wages.1
As a matter of theory, of course, the household’s consumption/leisure tradeoﬀ is the
a p p r o p r i a t em e a s u r eo ft h et r u es o c i a lc o s to fl a b o r .W a g ed a t aa r en o ta p p r o p r i a t e
if either wages are not allocative or if labor market frictions are present that drive a
wedge between market wages and the labor supply curve. As we demonstrate, our
markup construct is highly countercyclical. In addition, it also leads directly to a
measure of aggregate eﬃciency costs at each point in time.
1See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a survey of the literature on business cycles and coun-
tercyclical markups.
1Our approach builds on a stimulating paper by Hall (1997) that analyzes the
cyclical behavior of the neoclassical labor market equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, Hall ﬁrst
demonstrates that the business cycle is associated with highly procyclical movements
in the diﬀerence between the observable component of the household’s marginal rate
of substitution and the marginal product of labor. He then presents some evidence
to suggest that this diﬀerence is of central importance to employment ﬂuctuations.
Also relevant is Mulligan (2002) who examines essentially the same measure of the
labor market wedge, though focusing on its low frequency movements. Speciﬁcally,
he constructs an annual series of this variable, using data spanning more than a
century. He ﬁnds that marginal tax rates correlate well at low frequencies with this
labor market wedge. Finally, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004) ﬁnd that the labor
market wedge plays a critical role in accounting for the drop in employment during
the Great Depression.
A sw i t hH a l l ,w ef o c u so nt h eb e h a v i o ro ft h el a b o rm a r k e tw e d g ea tt h eb u s i n e s s
cycle frequency. We diﬀer in several important ways, however. First, his framework
treats this wedge simply as an exogenous driving force, interpretable for example as
reﬂecting shifts in preferences.2 We instead stress countercyclical markup variations
as the key factor accounting for the cyclical ﬂuctuations in this variable and present
evidence in support of this general hypothesis. Second, given our “markup interpre-
tation,” we are able to use the Hall residual as the basis for a measure of the eﬃciency
costs of business cycles.
In particular, with some auxiliary assumptions, it is possible to derive a measure of
the lost surplus in the labor market at each point in time based directly on movements
in our gap variable. Fluctuations generate eﬃciency costs on average because, as we
2To organize his approach, Hall (1997) modeled the labor market residual as an unobserved
preference shock, though he did not take this hypothesis literally, but rather as a starting point for
subsequent analysis. There has been a tendency in subsequent literature, however, (e.g. Holland
and Scott (1998), Francis and Ramey (2001), Uhlig (2002)) to interpret this residual as an exogenous
preference shock. Earlier literature as well oﬀered a similar interpretation (e.g. Baxter and King,
1991). Our analysis will suggest that this residual cannot simply reﬂect exogenous preference shifts.
2show, the surplus lost from a decline in employment below its natural level exceeds the
gain from a symmetric rise above its natural level. In this respect, our approach diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from Lucas (1987, 2003) who examines the welfare costs of consumption
variability associated with the cycle. While the Lucas measure does not really take
account of the sources of ﬂuctuations, our measure instead isolates the costs associated
with the ineﬃcient component of ﬂuctuations. Accordingly, our metric may give a
better sense of the potential gains from improved stabilization policy.
As i g n i ﬁcant additional feature is that our approach permits not only a measure of
the costs of ﬂuctuations on average, but also an assessment of the costs of particular
episodes. We ﬁnd, for example, that while the eﬃciency costs of ﬂuctuations are not
large when averaged across booms and recessions, the gross gains from booms and
losses from recessions can indeed be quite large. Indeed, as we show, our methodology
suggests that the U.S. economy experienced large eﬃciency costs during both the
1974-75 and 1980-82 recession. This consideration is highly relevant because it may
be that the main beneﬁt from good stabilization policies may be avoiding severe
recessions. To the extent that centrals banks have had either good skill or good
luck in keeping to a minimum the number of severe downturns, it may be that on
average the costs of ﬂuctuations are not large. This kind of unconditional calculation,
however, masks the kind of losses that can emerge if luck and/or skill suddenly turn
bad. For this reason, an examination of episodes where matters clearly did seem to
go awry can shed light on the importance of good policy management.
In section 2 we develop a framework for measuring the ineﬃciency gap in terms of
observables, conditional on some reasonably conventional assumptions about prefer-
ences and technology. We also show that it is possible to decompose the gap into price
and wage markup components. In section 3 we present empirical measures of this
variable for the postwar U.S. economy. The ineﬃciency gap exhibits large procycli-
cal swings. In addition, under the assumption that wages are allocational, most of
3its variation is associated with countercyclical movements in the wage markup.3 The
price markup shows, at best, a weak contemporaneous correlation. Under some alter-
natives to our baseline case, the price markup does move countercylcically. However,
movements in the wage markup still dominate the overall movements in the gap.
In section 4 we consider the possibility that purely exogenous factors (e.g. unob-
served preference shifts) underlie the variation in our gap measures. Speciﬁcally, we
present evidence that suggests that our gap variable is endogenous and thus cannot
simply reﬂect exogenous variation in preferences. The evidence is instead consistent
with our maintained hypothesis that endogenous variation in markups is largely re-
sponsible for the movement in the ineﬃciency gap. In Section 5 we then use this
link to examine both the unconditional eﬃciency costs of recessions and the condi-
tional costs associated with the major boom/bust episodes. Concluding remarks are
in section 7.
2 The Gap and its Components: Theory
Let the ineﬃciency gap (henceforth, the gap)b ed e ﬁned as follows:
gapt = mrst − mpnt (1)
where mrst and mpnt denote, respectively, the (log) marginal product of labor and
the (log) marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
As illustrated by Figure 1, our gap variable can be represented graphically as the
vertical distance between the perfectly competitive labor supply and labor demand
curves, evaluated at the current level of employment (or hours). In much of what
follows we assume that our gap variable follows a stationary process with a (possibly
nonzero) constant mean, denoted by gap (without any time subscript). The latter
represents the steady state deviation between mrst and mpnt. N o t i c et h a tt h e s e
3In this respect our results are consistent with recent evidence in Sbordone (1999, 2000), Galí and
Gertler (1999), Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997,
2001) that in somewhat diﬀerent contexts similarly point to an important role for wage rigiditiy.
4assumptions are consistent with both mrst and mpnt being nonstationary, as it is
likely to be the case in practice as well as in the equilibrium representation of a large
class of dynamic business cycle models.
We next relate the gap to the markups in the goods and labor markets. Under
the assumption of wage-taking ﬁrms, and in the absence of labor adjustment costs,
the nominal marginal cost is given by wt −mpnt,w h e r ewt is (log) compensation per
additional unit of labor input (including non-wage costs). Accordingly, we deﬁne the
aggregate price markup as follows:
µ
p
t = pt − (wt − mpnt) (2)
= mpnt − (wt − pt) (3)
The aggregate wage markup is given by:
µ
w
t =( wt − pt) − mrst (4)
i.e., it corresponds to the diﬀerence between the wage and the marginal disutility of
work, both expressed in terms of consumption. Notice that the wage markup should
be understood in a broad sense, including the wedge created by eﬃciency wages,
payroll taxes paid by the ﬁrm and labor income taxes paid by the worker, search
frictions, and so on.
There are a variety of frictions (perhaps most prominently, wage and price rigidi-
ties) which may induce ﬂuctuations in the markups: it is in this respect that these
frictions are associated with ineﬃcient cyclical ﬂuctuations, or more precisely, with
variations in the aggregate level of (in)eﬃciency. In particular, given that the marginal
rate of substitution is likely to be procyclical, rigidities in the real wage —resulting
either from nominal or real rigidities— will give rise to countercyclical movements
i nt h ew a g em a r k u p . 4 Similar rigidities may give rise, in turn, to a countercyclical
4Models with countercyclical wage markups due to nominal rigidities include Blanchard and
5price markup in response to demand shocks since, holding productivity constant, the
marginal product of labor is countercyclical.5 Alternatively, procyclical movements
in competitiveness could induce a countercyclical price markup, as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996), for example.
To formalize the link between markup behavior and the gap, we ﬁrst express
equation (1) as
gapt = −{[mpnt − (wt − pt)] + [(wt − pt) − mrst]} (5)
Combining equations (3), (4), and (5) then yields a fundamental relation linking






In the steady state, further:
gap = −(µ
p + µ
w) < 0 (7)
where variables without time subscripts denote steady state values.
It is natural to assume that µ
p
t ≥ 0 and µw
t ≥ 0 for all t,i m p l y i n ggapt ≤ 0
for all t.I nt h i sc a s et h el e v e lo fe c o n o m i ca c t i v i t yi si n e ﬃciently low (i.e., the gap
is always negative), so that (small) increases in our gap measure will be associated
with a smaller distortion (i.e., an allocation closer to the perfectly competitive one).
Notice also that countercyclical movements in these markups imply that the gap is
high in booms and low in recessions.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tw ec a nm e a s u r et h et w om a r k u p s( o r ,a tl e a s tt h e i rv a r i a t i o n ) ,
we can characterize the behavior of the gap, as well as its composition. Constructing
Kiyotaki (1987) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). Alexopolous (2000) develops a model with a
real rigidity due to eﬃiciency wages that can generate a countercyclical wage markup. Alternatively,
Hall (1997) stresses the possible role of countercyclical search frictions to account for the behavior
of the labor market residual.
5With productivity shocks, the markup could be procyclical (since the marginal product of labor
moves procyclically in that instance).
6our gap variable requires some assumptions about technology and preferences. Below
we consider a baseline case with reasonably conventional assumptions. Decomposing
the resulting gap variable between wage and price markups requires an additional
assumption, namely, that the observed wages used in the construction of the markup
reﬂect the shadow cost of hiring an additional unit of labor. Since this assumption
is likely to be more controversial, it is important to keep in mind that it is not
necessary in order to measure the gap as a whole, but it is only used in computing
its decomposition between the two markups.
Under the assumption of a technology with constant elasticity of output with
respect to hours (say, α), we have (up to an additive constant):
mpnt = yt − nt (8)
where yt is output per capita and nt is hours per capita.6
We assume that the (log) marginal rate of substitution for a representative con-
sumer can be written (up to an additive constant) as:
mrst = σc t + ϕn t − ξt (9)
where ct is consumption per capita and ξt is a low frequency preference shifter. Pa-
rameter σ is related to the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ϕ measures the
curvature of the disutility of labor.7 Following Hall (1997), we allow for the possibility
of low frequency shifts in preferences over consumption versus leisure, as represented
by movements in ξt. These preference shifts may be interpreted broadly to include
6Under certain assumptions that speciﬁcation is compatible with variable labor utilization, par-
ticularly if labor eﬀort moves roughly proportionately with hours per worker, and the latter is highly
positively correlated with aggregate hours (per capita), as the evidence suggests. See, e.g., Basu
and Kimball (1997) for a detailed discussion.
7The parameter ϕ measures the curvature of the utility function under the standard assumption
that labor supply adjusts along the intensive margin (i.e., over hours). As we show in Appendix A,
however, under certain assumptions our framework also allows for labor supply adjustment to occur
instead over the extensive margin (i.e., over participation.) Finally, this log-linear representation of
the mrs has been reconciled with balanced growth in a model with household production (see Baxter
and Jermann (1999), or in a generalized indivisible labor model (see King and Rebelo (1999).)
7institutional or demographic changes that aﬀect the labor market, but which are un-
likely to be of relevance at business cycle frequencies. We diﬀer from Hall, though,
by restricting these shifts to the low frequency. In section 4 we provide evidence to
justify this assumption.
U n d e rt h ea b o v ea s s u m p t i o n so u rg a pv a r i a b l ei st h u sg i v e nb y :
gapt =( σc t + ϕn t − ξt) − (yt − nt) (10)




t =( yt − nt) − (wt − pt) (11)
≡− st (12)
Hence the price markup can be measured (up to an additive constant) as minus




t =( wt − pt) − (σc t + ϕn t)+ξt (13)
3 The Gap and Its Components: Evidence
We now use the theoretical relations in the previous section to construct measures of
the gap and its two main components: the price and wage markups. Our evidence is
based on quarterly postwar U.S. data over the sample period 1960:I - 2004:IV.8
8The data used to construct the gap variable and its components were drawn from the USECON
database commercialized by Estima in Rats format. The time series used (with correspond-
ing mnemonics shown in brackets) include compensation per hour (LXNFC), hours all persons
(LXNFH), real and nominal output (LXNFO and LXNFI), all of which refer to the nonfarm business
sector. We also make use of the NIPA series for non-durable and services consumption (CNH+GSH).
In addition we also use population over sixteen (POP16) to express variables in per capita terms,
real GDP (GDPQ), implicit GDP deﬂator (GDPD), the Fed-funds rate (FFED), the spread be-
tween the 10-year government bond yield (FCM10) and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate (FTB3),
and a commodity price index (PSCOM) for our VAR exercise in Figure 4.
83.1 Baseline Case
Identiﬁcation of gap and wage markup variations requires that we make an assumption
on the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ and on ϕ, a parameter which corresponds
t ot h ei n v e r s eo ft h e( F r i s c h )w a g ee l a s t i c i t yo fl a b o rs u p p l y . Av a s ta m o u n to f
evidence from micro-data suggests wage elasticities mostly concentrated in the range
of 0.05−0.5.9 On the other hand, the business cyclel i t e r a t u r et e n d st ou s ev a l u e so f
unity and higher, using balanced growth considerations as a justiﬁcation, as opposed
to direct evidence (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995). We use as a baseline value
ϕ =1 , which we view as a reasonable compromise between the values suggested in
the micro and macro literature. In addition, because it will turn out that the costs
of ﬂuctuations vary inversely with the Frisch labor supply elasticity, we are biasing
our analysis against ﬁnding large welfare costs by choosing an elasticity that is above
most of the direct estimates in the literature.
The eﬃciency costs are also increasing in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,
since this parameter also aﬀects the steepness of the labor supply curve. There is,
however, a similar controversy over the value of this parameter, which corresponds
to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Direct estimates of the
latter tend to fall in the range 0.1−0.3. This evidence suggests a value of σ that varies
from 10 to 3.0.10 On the other hand, balanced growth considerations lead the macro
literature to a value of unity (again, see Cooley and Prescott, 1995.) We will use
unity as our baseline case, again opting to bias our parametrization against ﬁnding
large eﬃciency costs.
9In his survey of the literature, Card (1994) concludes that the intertemporal elasticity of labor
supply is “surely no higher than 0.5 and probably no higher than 0.2”. However, whether it is
appropriate to use the existing micro evidence to calibrate the intertermporal elasticity of labor
supply is a matter of considerable controversy, particularly to the extent that employment adjusts
along the extensive margin as well as the intensive margin (see, e.g., the discussion in Mulligan
(1998)).
10Using micro-data, Barsky et al. (1997) estimate an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
0.18, implying a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion slightly above 5. Using macro-data, Hall (1988)
concludes that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/σ) is likely below 0.2.
9In addition, we need to make an assumption to identify the low frequency shifter
ξt. Let e µ
w
t ≡ (wt−pt)−(σct+ϕn t) be the observable component of the wage markup





t − ξt (14)
From this perspective, the wage markup µw
t is the “cyclical” component of e µ
w
t and
ξt is (minus) the “trend” component. We approximate the low frequency movements
o ft h ew a g em a r k u pb yﬁtting a third-order polynomial of time to e µ
w
t .11
Finally, before proceeding, we note that the relationships derived in the previous
section hold only up to an additive constant. Accordingly, our framework only allows
us to identify the variations over time in the markup and its components, but not
their levels. Identiﬁcation of the level requires that we calibrate the steady state
markup, gap = −(µp + µw),a ni s s u et ow h i c hw et u r nb e l o w .
Our baseline results thus employ measures of the price and wage markups and the
gap constructed using, respectively, equations (6), (12), and (13), expressed in terms
of deviations from their respective sample means.
Figure 2 presents the times series measure of our gap variable under our baseline
assumptions of σ =1and ϕ =1 .N o t i c et h a tt h i sv a r i a b l ec o m m o v e ss t r o n g l yw i t ht h e
business cycle, displaying large declines during NBER-dated recessions (represented
by the shaded areas in the graph).
We next decompose the movements of the gap into its wage and price markup
components. The wage markup measures were constructed using (13).12 The price
markup corresponds to minus the log of real unit labor costs, as implied by (12).
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the gap against the wage markup (both relative to
their means). To facilitate visual inspection, we plot the inverse of the wage markup
11Because we use the gap measure in subsequent time series analysis, we opt for a high order
polynominal instead of a band pass ﬁlter to detrend the data.
12The results are robust to simple adjustments for compositional bias of the real wage, based on
Barsky, Solon and Parker (1994).
10(i.e., minus the log wage markup). By deﬁnition, the diﬀerence between the gap and
the inverse wage markup is the inverse price markup. What is striking about the
pictures is the strong co-movement between the gap and the (inverse) wage markup.
Put diﬀerently, our evidence suggests that the ineﬃciency gap seems to be driven
largely by countercyclical movements in the wage markup.13
To be clear, our conclusion that countercyclical wage markup variation drives the
variation in the gap rests on the assumption that wages are allocational and can thus
be used to construct a relevant cost measure.14 While this assumption is standard in
the literature on business cycles and markups (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999),
it is not without controversy. Notice, however, that even if observed wages are not
allocational, our gap variable is still appropriately measured, since its construction
does not require the use of wage data. Thus our welfare analysis, which depends on
the overall gap and not its decomposition, is not aﬀected by this issue.
Table 1 reports some basic statistics that support the visual evidence in Figure
3. In particular, the Table reports a set of second moments for the gap and its
two components: the wage and price markup, and also for detrended (log) GDP, a
common indicator of the business cycle. Note ﬁrst that the percent standard deviation
of the gap is large (relative to detrended output) and that departures of the gap from
steady state are highly persistent. In addition, the wage markup is nearly as volatile
as the overall gap, and is strongly negatively correlated with the latter, as well as
with detrended GDP. This conﬁrms the visual evidence that movements in the gap
are strongly associated with countercyclical movements in the wage markup. On the
other hand, the price markup is less volatile than the wage markup and does not
13As a somewhat cleaner way to illustrate the strong countercylical relation between the gap and
the wage markup, we show later that this pattern also holds conditional on a shock to monetary
policy.
14Some indirect evidence that wages are allocational is found in Sbordone (2002) and Galí and
Gertler (1999) who show that ﬁrms appear to adjust prices in response to measures of marginal
cost based on wage data. In turn, as shown in Galí (2001), they do not respond to marginal cost
measures that employ the household’s marginal rate of substitution in place of the wage, as would
be appropriate if wages were not allocational.
11exhibit a strong contemporaneous correlation with the gap.15
3.1.1 Robustness to Alternative Speciﬁcations of Technology and Costs
We next investigate the robustness of our results to the use of alternative speciﬁcations
of technology and costs. Our baseline case assumes constant elasticity of output
with respect to hours and takes the observed average wage as the relevant cost of
hiring additional labor. We consider four alternatives to this baseline proposed by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) in their analysis of cyclical markup behavior. The
speciﬁc formulations and (subsequent calibrations) we use follow their analysis closely.
Each of the alternatives to the baseline enhances the countercyclical movement
in the price markup by making marginal cost more procyclical. The ﬁrst alternative
model assumes a CES production function, thus relaxing the assumption of a constant
elasticity of output with respect to labor. The second model allows for overhead labor.
The third model, which is based on Bils (1987), allows for the marginal wage to diﬀer
from the average wage due to an overtime premium. Finally, the fourth model allows
for convex costs of adjusting labor.
In Appendix B we present a detailed exposition of how each case aﬀects the
measure of the gap and its markup components. We also discuss the calibration. As
the appendix makes clear, the CES, overhead labor, and adjustment cost models all
alter the marginal product of labor. They accordingly aﬀect the measures of both
the overall gap and the price markup. However, they do not aﬀect the measure
of the wage markup. On the other hand, the marginal wage model alters only the
composition of the gap between the price and wage markups at each point in time,
without inﬂuencing the gap variable itself (since it aﬀects neither the marginal product
of labor nor the household marginal rate of substitution.)
The diﬀerent panels of Table 2 report basic statistics for the alternative measures
15However, the relatively weak co-movement of the price markup with detrended output is useful
for understanding the dynamics of inﬂation and the recent evidence on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. See Sbordone (1999) and Galí and Gertler (1999).
12of the gap and its components, analogous to those reported in Table 1 for the base-
line case. Overall, the central results from our baseline case are robust to all the
alternatives. Both the volatility and persistence of the gap are very similar across
all cases. It also remains true in all cases that most of the variation in the gap is
due to the variation in the wage markup as opposed to the price markup. The only
signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that the price markup tends to display a stronger counter-
cyclical movement relative to the baseline case. In contrast to the baseline model, the
price markup in the CES, overhead labor, and marginal wage models is negatively
correlated with the output gap. In all the alternative models, further, the negative
co-movement of the price markup with our gap variable is larger than in the baseline
case.
In the panel A of Figure 4 we show the historical movement in the gap is robust
to the alternative cases. We plot the time series of the gap for the baseline case
against the all the alternatives except the marginal wage model (since in this latter
case the measure of the overall gap is the same as for the baseline.) Clearly, the
gap measures move very tightly together in all cases. Finally, while the gap measure
in the marginal model is the same as the baseline case, the division into price and
wage markup movements diﬀers. Accordingly, in panel B of Figure 4 we plot the
wage markup for the marginal model (Bils adjustment) relative to the baseline case.
As the ﬁgure shows, the broad pattern in the movement of the wage markup is very
similar across the two cases.
To summarize: the results thus far suggest that the business cycle is associated
with large coincident movements in the eﬃciency gap. Thus, under our framework,
the evidence suggests that countercyclical markup behavior is potentially an impor-
tant feature of the business cycle. A decomposition of the gap, further, suggests that
the countercyclical movement in the wage markup is by far the most important source
of overall variations in the gap. Thus, to the extent wages are allocational, some form
of wage rigidity, either real or nominal, may be central to business ﬂuctuations.
134 Labor Supply Shifts and the Gap
We have proceeded under the interpretation that our measured gap between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor reﬂects countercyclical
markup behavior. In his baseline identiﬁcation scheme, however, Hall modeled this
gap as an unobserved preference shock, though he was clear to state that he did
not take this hypothesis literally. Subsequent literature, however, (e.g., Holland and
Scott (1998), Francis and Ramey (2001) and Uhlig (2002)) has indeed interpreted this
residual as reﬂecting either exogenous labor supply shifts or some other unspeciﬁed
exogenous driving force. In this section we show that the high frequency movements
in the gap cannot be simply due to exogenous preference shifts. Rather, the evidence
is instead compatible with our countercyclical markup interpretation.
Let us follow Hall (1997) by assuming that the marginal rate of substitution is
now augmented with a preference shock ξt that contains a cyclical component, e ξt,a s
well as a trend component, ξt:
mrst = ct + ϕn t − ξt (15)
with
ξt = ξt +e ξt
where we maintain our baseline assumption that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion, σ,i su n i t y .H a l lt h e nd e ﬁnes the residual xt as the diﬀerence between the “ob-
servable” component of the marginal rate of substitution, ct+ϕn t, and the marginal
product of labor, yt − nt :
xt ≡ (ct + ϕn t) − (yt − nt) (16)
The issue then is how exactly to interpret the movement in Hall’s residual. Using
the augmented speciﬁcation of the marginal rate of substitution allowing for prefer-
14ence shocks (15), together with (8) and the deﬁnition of the ineﬃciency gap (1), it is
possible to express xt as follows:










t =0 . This allows him to interpret variable xt as a preference shock, since
under this assumption xt = ξt.16 Notice that under these circumstances the eﬃciency
gap is zero, as there are no imperfections in either goods or labor markets. On the
other hand, if preferences are not subject to shocks (ξt =0 ,a l lt), and we allow for
departures from perfect competition, xt will purely reﬂect movements in markups,
i.e., xt = −(µ
p
t +µw
t ). In the latter instance, xt corresponds exactly to our ineﬃciency
gap, i.e., xt = gapt,f o ra l lt.
Note that if xt indeed reﬂects exogenous preference shocks, it should be invariant
to any other type of disturbance. In other words, the null hypothesis of preference
shocks implies that xt should be exogenous. We next present two tests that reject
the null of exogeneity, thus rejecting the preference shock hypothesis.
First, we test the hypothesis of no-Granger-causality from a number of variables
to our gap measure. The variables used are: detrended GDP, the nominal interest
rate, and the yield spread. Both the nominal interest rate and the yield spread may
be thought of as a rough measure of the stance of monetary policy, while detrended
GDP is just a simple cyclical indicator. Table 3 displays the p-values for several
Granger-causality tests. These statistics correspond to bivariate tests using alterna-
tive lag lengths. They indicate that the null of no Granger-causality is rejected for
all speciﬁcations, at conventional signiﬁcance levels. That ﬁnding is robust to reason-
able alternative calibrations of σ and ϕ. Overall, the evidence of Granger causality is
16See also Baxter and King (1991). Holland and Scott (1998) construct similar measures for the
U.K.
15inconsistent with the hypothesis that xt mainly reﬂects variations in preferences.
As a second test, we estimate the dynamic response of our gap variable to an
identiﬁed exogenous monetary policy shock. The identiﬁcation scheme is similar to
the one proposed by Christiano et al. (1999), and others. It is based on a VAR that
includes measures of output, the price level, commodity prices, and the Federal Funds
rate, to which we add our gap measure (or, equivalently, Hall’s residual) and the price
markup. From the gap and the price markup response we can back out the behavior
of the wage markup, using equation (6). We identify the monetary policy shock as the
orthogonalized innovation to the Federal Funds rate, under the assumption that this
shock does not have a contemporaneous eﬀect on the other variables in the system.
Figure 5 shows the estimated responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
The responses of the nominal rate, output, consumption and prices are similar to those
f o u n di nC h r i s t i a n oet al. (1999), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and other papers
in the literature. Most interestingly for our purposes, the ineﬃciency gap declines
signiﬁcantly in response to the unanticipated monetary tightening. Its overall pattern
of response closely mimics the response of output. This endogenous reaction, of
course, is inconsistent with the preference shock hypothesis, but fully consistent with
our hypothesis that countercyclical markups may underlie the cyclical variation in the
Hall residual. In this respect, note that the monetary shock induces a rise in the wage
markup that closely mirrors the decline in the gap, both in shape and magnitude of
the response. This countercyclical movement in the wage markup is consistent with
evidence on unconditional comovements presented in Table 1. The price markup also
rises, though with a signiﬁcant lag. Apparently, the sluggish response of wages, which
gives rise to a strong countercyclical movement in the wage markup, delays the rise
in the price markup.17 In any event, the decline in the ineﬃciency gap is clearly
17As Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (1999) observe, the sluggish behavior of the price
markup helps explain the inertial behavior of inﬂation, manifested in this case by the delayed and
weak response of inﬂation to the monetary shock. Staggered pricing models relate inﬂation to
an expected discounted stream of real marginal costs, which corresponds to the inverse of the price
markup. The sluggish response to the price markup translates into sluggish behavior of real marginal
16associated with a countercyclical rise in markups.
To be clear, because preference shocks are not observable, it is not possible to
directly determine the overall importance of these disturbances. While our evidence
rejects the hypothesis that exogenous preference variation drives all the movement
in our gap measure, it cannot rule out the possibility that some of this movement
is due to preference shocks. Yet, to the extent that preference shocks are mainly a
low frequency phenomenon then they are likely to be captured by the trend compo-
nent associated with our low frequency ﬁlter (together with other institutional and
demographic factors which may lead to low frequency variations in markups). In this
instance our ﬁltered gap series, which isolates the high frequency movement in this
variables, is likely to be largely uncontaminated by exogenous preference variations.
5W e l f a r e a n d t h e G a p
We next propose a simple way to measure the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations in the de-
gree of ineﬃciency of aggregate resource allocations, as captured by our gap variable.
We then apply this methodology to postwar U.S. data. In addition to obtaining a
measure of the average cost of gap ﬂuctuations, we also compute the welfare losses
during particular episodes, including the major postwar recessions.
As we noted in the introduction, our approach diﬀers from Lucas (1987) and others
by focusing on the costs stemming from ﬂuctuations in the degree of ineﬃciency of the
aggregate resource allocation, as reﬂected by the movements in our gap variable.18 As
in Ball and Romer (1987), the cycle generates losses on average within our framework
because the welfare eﬀects of employment ﬂuctuations about the steady state are
asymmetric. As Figure 1 illustrates, given that the steady state level of employment is
ineﬃc i e n t( d u et op o s i t i v ep r i c ea n dw a g em a r k u p si nt h es t e a d ys t a t e ) ,t h ee ﬃciency
cost.
18For other approaches to measuring the unconditional costs of ﬂuctuations see, e.g., Barlevy
(2000) and Beaudry and Pages (2001). For a very early attempt to measure the welfare cost of
ineﬃciently high unemployment, see Gordon (1973).
17costs of an employment contraction below the steady state will exceed the beneﬁts of
a symmetric increase. In particular, note that the vertical distance between the labor
demand and supply curves rises as employment falls below the steady state and falls
when employment moves above. The quantitative eﬀect of this nonlinearity on the
welfare cost of ﬂuctuations ultimately depends on the slopes of the labor demand and
supply curves, and on the steady state distance relative to the ﬁrst-best, perfectly
competitive steady state.
Underlying this measure of the average costs of ﬂuctuations are the gross gains
from booms and losses from recessions. As we elaborate, under our maintained hy-
pothesis that the ﬂexible price equilibrium is distorted (due to imperfect competition
and taxes, etc.), there are signiﬁcant ﬁrst order welfare losses from employment con-
tractions below the steady state, as well as gains from movements above. Below we
present a times series measure of these gross eﬃciency costs and beneﬁts, along with
an overall net measure.
5.1 A Welfare Measure
We now proceed to derive our welfare measure. The economy is assumed to ﬂuctuate




=e x p {−µ} ≡ 1 − Φ < 1
where upper bars denote values along a constant gap path, and µ is (minus) the
steady state value of our (log) gap variable. A second order approximation of the
period utility around its level along the underlying constant-gap path yields:



















18where the hats denote log deviations from the underlying constant-gap path, i.e.





,a n dw h e r eϕ ≡−
Unn,tNt
Un,t and σ ≡−
Ucc,tCt
Uc,t .
In order to maintain tractability, we make two additional assumptions. First, we
assume that all output is consumed, which in turn implies e ct = e yt for all t.S e c o n d l y ,
we assume that output is linearly related to hours in equilibrium, i.e. yt = at + nt,
thus implying e nt = e yt. The latter assumption is consistent with the notion that
variations in the stock of capital are negligible at business cycle frequencies, and that






Hence, we can rewrite the second order approximation as
∆t = Uc,tCt
½
Φ e yt −
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Furthermore, under the previous assumptions, together with the log-linear speci-
ﬁcation for the marginal rate of substitution in (9) it is easy to check that
d gapt =( σ + ϕ) e yt





















Notice that ω(d gapt) is the period eﬃciency loss or gain from gap deviations from its
steady state value, expressed as a percentage of the frictionless level of consumption
Ct.T h e ﬁrst term in brackets, the linear term, reﬂects the symmetric ﬁrst-order
costs and beneﬁts from the gap moving below and above the steady state, due to the
19positive steady state markup µ (implying Φ > 0). The quadratic term captures the
asymmetric, second order eﬀects of gap ﬂuctuations on welfare. For plausible values
of µ, σ,a n dϕ we have Ψ > 0.I nt h a tc a s eω is concave, implying that a reduction
in the gap below its steady state value results in an eﬃciency loss that exceeds the
gain stemming from a commensurate increase in the gap above its steady state.
We can use equation (20) to calculate a time series of the eﬃciency gain or loss in
each quarter t. To obtain a measure of the average welfare cost over time analogous











where var(gapt) is the variance of our gap measure. Notice that, as a result of the
concavity of ω, the expected welfare eﬀects of ﬂuctuations in the gap variable are
negative, i.e. these ﬂuctuations imply losses in expected welfare. This loss, further,
is of “second order” as it is linearly related to the variance of the ineﬃciency gap. It is,
however, potentially large, depending in particular on the magnitude var(gapt).A s
section 3 suggests, var(gapt), is potentially large if labor supply is relatively inelastic
or risk aversion is relatively high.
To be clear, our approach provides a lower bound on the measure of the total
welfare costs of ﬂuctuations. The reason is simple: it does not include the welfare costs
from eﬃcient ﬂuctuations in consumption and employment. Suppose, for example,
that the data were generated by a real business cycle model with frictionless, perfectly
competitive markets. We should then expect to see no variation in our gap measure, as
the resource allocation would always be eﬃcient. Our metric would then indicate no
welfare costs of ﬂuctuations, while some losses would still be implied by the variability
of consumption and leisure (under standard convexity assumptions on preferences).
It is also important to stress that, to the extent that the steady state value of the
gap corresponds also to the average value around which the economy ﬂuctuates, as
20assumed above, average welfare losses will only be of second order. On the other
hand, our eﬃciency cost measure suggests possible ﬁrst order eﬀects at any moment
in time: As reﬂected in equation (20) and illustrated further below, deviations in the
gap variable from that steady state may have non-negligible ﬁrst-order welfare eﬀects,
with the gap declines associated with recessions generating large welfare losses.
5.2 Some Numbers
Equation (20) provides a real time measure of the eﬃciency costs of deviations of
our gap variable from steady state. Accordingly, we construct a quarterly time series
of ω(d gapt), taking as input our measure of the gap. We consider three diﬀerent
parameterizations: ﬁrst our baseline case with σ =1and ϕ =1 ; second, a case where
we raise risk aversion with σ =5and ϕ =1 ; and third, a case where we reduce labor
supply elasticity with σ =1and ϕ =5(implying a Frisch labor supply elasticity of
0.2). For the parameter µ, the sum of the steady state wage and price markups, we
assume a value of 0.50. Av a l u eo f0.15 to 0.20 is plausible for the steady state price
markup (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). Since the steady state wage markup
d e p e n d so nt a xd i s t o r t i o n sa sw e l la sw o r k e r s ’m a r k e tp o w e r ,0.30 to 0.35 seems a
reasonable lower bound given the evidence on average labor tax rates. This range is
also roughly consistent with the evidence in Mulligan (2002).
Figure 6 plots the resulting time series over the sample 1960:IV-2004:IV. The
value at each period t can be interpreted as the eﬃciency gain or loss in percent-
age units of consumption associated with the deviation of the ineﬃciency gap from
its steady state. Our baseline parametrization indicates substantial ﬂuctuations in
welfare resulting with changes in the degree of aggregate eﬃciency. For example,
eﬃciency-based welfare losses during the major recessions are on average around 2.0
percent of period consumption around the time of the respective troughs. Further-
more, during the major recessions this large welfare losses tend to persist for a number
of years. Conversely, the average gain at the major cyclical peaks is a bit over 1.0
21percent. These gains also tend to persist.
With higher risk aversion (σ =5 ) or lower labor supply elasticity (ϕ =5 ) the losses
during downturns go up while the gains during booms decline. In either case the labor
supply curve is steeper relative to the baseline case, enhancing the asymmetric eﬀects
on eﬃciency of symmetric movements in employment above and below its natural
level. In the case of low labor supply elasticity, for example, the eﬃciency losses
during the major recessions hover around 3.0 percent of consumption per period
around the time of the respective troughs.
In Table 4 we present a measure of the average welfare cost of the cycle, based on
equation (21). As we noted earlier, the measure is simply proportionate to the square
of the gap. We construct estimates for alternative values of the parameters ϕ and σ.
For the parameterization that corresponds to our baseline case (ϕ =1 ,σ =1 ), we
estimate the average eﬃciency costs of postwar U.S. business ﬂuctuations to be quite
small, roughly 0.01 percent of steady state consumption. In this case, the asymmetric
movements in eﬃciency over the cycle are small, implying that the gains during booms
seen in Figure 6 approximately cancel the losses during recessions. The estimates of
eﬃciency losses go up as we reduce labor supply elasticity and increase risk aversion.
With ϕ =5and σ =1 0 , for example, the average eﬃciency costs go up to 0.08.T h i s
number, however, is still not large and is in the range of Lucas’ original estimates.
Any measure of the average cost of business cycles, however, obscures the fact that
individual recessionary episodes may be rather costly. What moderates the impact
of these episodes on the overall welfare measure is the fact they have been relatively
infrequent, particularly over the last several decades. One reason for this may be
that stabilization policy has been reasonably eﬀective. Another possibility is that
the economy has been subject to smaller shocks. In either event, it is of interest to
examine eﬃciency losses during the major recessionary episodes. Doing so provides
a sense of the gains from avoiding future recessions (either by good policy or by good
luck.)
22There are three distinct recessionary periods in our sample where the gap fell
below steady state prior to the trough and then returned to steady state following
the trough. These periods include the two major recessions of the mid 1970s and
of the early 1980s and also the recession of the early 1990s.19 For each recessionary
period, we report the cumulative eﬃciency losses over the recession as a percent of
one year’s consumption. We again consider a variety of parameterizations, including
our baseline case.
Table 5 reports the eﬃciency losses for the three recessionary periods. For our
baseline case (σ =1and ϕ =1 ), the eﬃciency costs of each of the two major recessions
was large, roughly 4.5 percent of one year’s consumption. For the milder recession
of 90s the cost was still non-trivial, more than 2 percent of one year’s consumption.
With lower labor supply elasticity (ϕ =5 ) ,t h ee ﬃciency costs of the two major
recessions rise to over 6.0 percent of one year’s consumption, while the the cost of the
90s recession rises to over 3.0 percent.
Increasing risk aversion boosts the costs of the recession in the early 1980s. With
σ =5 , the eﬃciency cost of the downturn rises to over 7.0 percent of steady state
consumption in the high labor supply elasticity case (ϕ =1 ). It goes up to 8.0 percent
when combined with low labor supply elasticity (ϕ =5 ). Interestingly, for the other
two recessions, raising risk aversion actually tends to reduce the estimated eﬃciency
cost. Intuitively, higher risk aversion places relatively more weight on consumption
in the measure of gap ﬂuctuations. Since the decline in consumption was relatively
modest in each of these downturns, as compared to the 80-82 recession, increasing
risk aversion tends to dampen gap ﬂuctuations over these periods. For these reasons
it reduces measured eﬃciency losses.
Overall, our results suggest only modest average eﬃciency losses from ﬂuctuations.
However, major recessionary episodes appear to entail rather signiﬁcant losses.
19For the other recessions in the sample (the early 1960s and the early 2000s), we do not have the
complete swing of the gap below and back to steady state.
236 Concluding Comments
A tt h er i s ko fc o n s i d e r a b l eo v e r s i m p l i ﬁcation, it is possible to classify modern business
cycle models into two types. The ﬁrst class attempts to explain quantity ﬂuctuations
by appealing to high degrees of intertemporal substitution in an environment of fric-
tionless markets. The second instead appeals to countercyclical markups owing to
particular market frictions. In this regard, there has been a considerable debate as to
whether the markup is indeed countercyclical (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
for a summary). Much of this debate has been centered around price markup mea-
sures that use wage data to calculate the cost of labor. We show, however, that the
markup is highly countercyclical, using the household’s consumption/leisure trade-
oﬀ as the shadow cost of labor, as theory would suggest. Under this identiﬁcation
scheme, the markup corresponds exactly to the labor market residual studied by Hall
(1997) and others. Whether the countercyclical markup variation is driven primarily
by product market or labor market behavior is, however, an open question. To the
extent that wages are allocative, we ﬁnd that labor market frictions are the key factor.
As we discussed, however, the exact form that these frictions may take (e.g., nominal
wage rigidity, eﬃciency wages, search frictions, etc.) is also an open question.
A second message of this paper is that to the extent that our markup interpretation
of the eﬃciency gap is correct, business cycles may involve signiﬁcant eﬃciency costs.
To be sure, our results suggest that these eﬃciency losses are modest when averaged
over time. This result occurs, however, because -whether by good luck or good policy-
signiﬁcant recessions have not often occurred in the post war. We ﬁnd, however
that when they do occur, the eﬃciency costs may indeed be quite large. These
results obtain for reasonably standard assumptions on preferences (e.g., a coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion of ﬁve and a unit-elastic Frisch labor supply). Thus, while
the gains from eliminating all ﬂuctuations may not be large —as suggested by the
existing literature— there nonetheless do appear to be signiﬁcant eﬃciency beneﬁts
from avoiding severe recessions.
24Finally, we observe that our calculation ignores at least several important consid-
erations that might be leading us to understate the eﬃciency costs of recessions. First,
within our framework, a reduction in hours leads to increased enjoyment of leisure,
which partially oﬀsets the impact of the output decline. In reality, workers who are
laid oﬀ during recessions do not simply get to enjoy the time oﬀ, but rather have to
look for a new job. In addition, there is often a loss of human capital that was speciﬁc
to the previous employer. Second, our calculation ignores the costs of ﬂuctuations in
price and wage inﬂation associated with variations in markups resulting from nominal
rigidities (see, e.g. Woodford (1999)). For this reason, our metric may overstate the
gains from booms (and understate the losses from recessions). To the extent that the
costs of high inﬂation roughly oﬀset the eﬃciency gains from the boom, our measure
of the gross eﬃciency loss of the recession may provide a more accurate indicator of
the costs of these episodes. Taking into account these considerations is on the agenda
for future research.
25Appendix A: The Household’s MRS
Here we illustrate that the expression we use for the household’s marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure, equation (9), may be motivated either
by making the standard assumption that labor supply adjusts along the intensive
margin or, under certain assumptions, that the adjustment is along the extensive
margin. Our argument is based on Mulligan (1998).
Case I: Labor Supply Adjustment Along the Intensive Margin
Let Ct and Nt denote consumption and hours worked, respectively. Assume a

















By taking the log of each side of this relation we obtain equation (9).
Case II: Labor Supply Adjustment Along the Extensive Margin
Now assume that individuals either do not work or work a ﬁxed amount of hours
per week. Suppose there is a representative household with a continuum of members
represented by the unit interval, and who diﬀer according to their disutility of work.
Speciﬁcally, let us assume that jϕ is the disutility of work for member j. Under perfect
consumption insurance within the household, and interpreting Nt as the fraction of



















Accordingly, the utility function for the family in this case is isomorphic to case
of adjustment along the intensive margin. It follows that the marginal rate of substi-
tution has the same form as well.
26Appendix B: Alternative speciﬁcations
We now present the details that underly the alternative measures of the gap and
its components that we examined in the text. Our baseline case assumes constant
elasticity of output with respect to hours and takes the observed average wage as the
relevant cost of hiring additional labor. Thef o u ra l t e r n a t i v e sw ec o n s i d e ra r et h o s e
proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) in their analysis of cyclical markup
behavior. As discussed in the text, deviations from the baseline include: CES pro-
duction; overhead labor, marginal wage diﬀering from the average wage due to an
overtime premium, and convex costs of adjusting labor.
As will become clear, the CES, overhead labor, and adjustment cost models all
alter the marginal product of labor. They accordingly aﬀect the measures of both
the overall gap and the price markup, but not the wage markup. On the other hand,
the marginal wage model alters only the composition of the gap between the price
and wage markups at each point in time, without inﬂuencing the gap variable itself.
Baseline Speciﬁcation Our baseline case assumes no adjustment costs and a
production function isoelastic in labor, i.e. Yt = F(Xt)Nα
t .I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v et h e
following expressions for the (log) marginal product of labor and the price markup
(up to an additive constant):
mpnt = yt − nt
µ
p
t = pt − (wt − mpnt)
= − st
where st is the log labor share. These two formulae are then used in conjunction with
information on the households’ marginal rate of substitution to obtain measures of
the gap and the wage markup.
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ν−1. The implied elasticity of output with respect to labor
input, ηt ≡ ∂Yt
∂Nt
Nt
Yt is given by






Log-linearizing around a steady state yields (ignoring constants) logηt = ϑ(yt−kt),
where ϑ ≡ (1 − ν−1)(η−1 − 1).S i n c eMPNt = ηt
Yt
Nt we can write:




t = pt − (wt − mpnt)
= − st + ϑ(yt − kt)






Pt ) . This allows allows us to derive a simple expression for the steady state value
of the elasticity of output with respect to labor as a function of the steady state
price markup and the labor share, i.e. η = SMp. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
calibrate coeﬃcient ϑ using approximate values for the average labor income share
(S =0 .7), the average gross price markup (close to unity), and an estimate for
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (ν =0 .5), all of which combined
yield a value ϑ = −0.4.
Overhead Labor For this case we assume a technology given by the production
function Yt = ZtK
1−α
t (Nt − N∗
t )α,w h e r eN∗
t denotes the amount of overhead labor








28Log linearizing around the steady state and ignoring constants yields logηt = −δ
b nt,w h e r eδ ≡ N∗
N−N∗ is the steady state ratio of overhead to variable labor, and
b nt denotes the log deviation of hours from its long run trend (around which the
linearization is carried out). Using the fact that MPNt = ηt
Yt
Nt, it follows that




t = pt − (wt − mpnt)
= −st − δ b nt
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) use a zero proﬁt condition in steady state in
order to calibrate δ. In particular, it can be shown that the ratio of average costs





t ). This implies the following
steady state relationship: AC = 1
M + δ
1+δS. Following Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), we assume S =0 .7, M =1 .25, and impose the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nAC =1 ,
thus implying δ =0 .4. We use the latter value to construct our “overhead labor”
measure of the gap and the price markup.
Marginal Wage diﬀerent from Average Wage I nt h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sw e
have assumed that ﬁrms are wage-taking so that the marginal wage is equal to the
average wage. As emphasized by Bils (1987) this will not be the case if the wage
rises as ﬁrms ask their employees to work more hours. The relevant wage needed
to compute both the price and wage markups is no longer the average wage but the
marginal wage, Wm. Notice however, that the use of the marginal wage will only
alter the decomposition of our gap measure between the price and the wage markup,
but not the gap measure itself.
Let qt ≡ wm
t −wt denote the ratio of the marginal to the average wage (expressed
29in logs). The it follows that
µ
p
t = pt − (w
m
t − mpnt)
= pt − (wt − mpnt) − qt






t − pt) − mrst
=( wt − pt) − mrst + qt
Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) propose a simple model of over-
time pay which implies that the ratio Qt is an increasing function of hours per worker
Ht. Log-linearization of that function around a steady state value for hours per
worker allows us to rewrite the price markup as
µ
p
t = pt − (wt − mpnt) − τ b ht
where τ is the elasticity of the marginal to average wage ratio with respect to hours
per worker.
Similarly, the wage markup will now be given by
µ
w
t =( wt − pt) − mrst + τ b ht
As discussed in Bils (1987), the assumption of a ﬁfty percent overtime premium
(the statutory premium in the U.S.) implies τ =1 .4, which we use to construct our
“overtime” measure of the price and wage markups.
Labor Adjustment Costs
Finally, we consider the implications of having a cost of adjusting labor, which we
assume take the form of output lost. Those cost are to be taken into account when
computing ﬁrms’ marginal costs and hence price markups. Following Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), we assume that those costs take the form UtNtφ(Nt/Nt−1),w h e r eUt
30is the price of the input required to make the adjustment. In this case, the (expected)














where Rt,t+1 is the usual stochastic discount factor for one period ahead income.
Hence, the expression for the price markup is given by
µ
p
t = pt − (wt + bt − mpnt)
= − st − bt
Assuming that the ratio Ut
Wt is stationary, we can derive the following expression
in terms of deviations from steady state as follows (ignoring constants):
bt = ξ (∆nt − βE t{∆nt+1})
where ξ ≡ (U/W)φ
00(1) and β = Rγu with γu being the steady state value for Ut+1/Ut.
Hence, the expression for the price markup can now be written as
µ
p
t = − st − ξ (∆nt − βE t{∆nt+1})
We construct our “adjustment cost” measure of price markups under the assump-
tion that β =0 .99 and ξ =4 , the values suggested by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999).
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36Table 1. Basic Statistics: 1960-2004
Baseline Calibration (σ =1 , ϕ =1 )
Variable s.d.(%) ρ Cross Correlation
GDP Gap Price Mkup Wage Mkup
GDP 2.6 0.94 1
Gap 5.1 0.95 0.77 1
Price Markup 2.1 0.88 0.28 -0.02 1
Wage Markup 5.4 0.95 -0.83 -0.92 -0.37 1
Note: Column labeled GDP corresponds to detrended (log) GDP.
37Table 2. Basic Statistics: 1960-2004
Robustness: Alternative Measures of Real Marginal Cost
Variable s.d.(%) ρ Cross Correlation
GDP Gap Price Mkup
Gap
CES 4.8 0.95 0.72
Overhead 6.4 0.95 0.80
Adj. cost 5.3 0.92 0.81
Bils 5.1 0.95 0.77
Price Markup
CES 2.0 0.92 -0.02 -0.21
Overhead 2.5 0.90 -0.21 -0.54
Adj. cost 2.1 0.78 0.13 -0.24
Bils 3.0 0.92 -0.17 -0.45
Wage Markup
CES 4.8 0.94 -0.71 -0.92 -0.20
Overhead 5.5 0.94 -0.83 -0.93 0.20
Adj. cost 5.5 0.94 -0.83 -0.93 -0.25
Bils 4.4 0.94 -0.74 -0.84 -0.05
38Table 3. Granger Causality Tests (1960-2004)
Baseline Calibration (σ =1 , ϕ =1 )
Bivariate VAR (4 lags)
Variable Baseline CES Overhead Adj. cost Bils
CBO Output Gap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
Nominal Interest Rate 0.270 0.048 0.200 0.106 0.275
Yield Spread 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.006
Note: The values reported are p-values for the null hypothesis of no Granger
causality from each variable listed to Hall x (F-test). Filtered data using third order
polynomial in time.
39Table 4. Welfare Costs of Fluctuations (1960-2004)
(percent of one year’s consumption)
ϕ =1 ϕ =5
σ =1 0.010 0.043
σ =5 0.027 0.059
σ =1 0 0.049 0.080
Note: Based on calibration µ =0 .5.T h e d a t a w a s ﬁltered using third
order polynomial in time. Welfare computations cover the sample period
1960:1-2004:3.
T a b l e5 .T h eW e l f a r eC o s t so fR e c e s s i o nE p i s o d e s
(percent of one year’s consumption)
70’s 80’s 90’s
σ =1 ,ϕ=1 -4.58 -4.69 -2.26
σ =1 ,ϕ=5 -6.18 -6.37 -3.22
σ =5 ,ϕ=1 -2.88 -7.23 -0.39
σ =5 ,ϕ=5 -4.89 -8.00 -1.65
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A. The Gap: Alternative Measures 














B. Wage Markup: Bils Adjustment 
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Figure 5. Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks 
Baseline Calibration, Sample Period: 1960-2004 
nom.rate
































































Note: 95% confidence bands for Impulse Responses are based 










 Figure 6.  The Welfare Effects of Postwar U.S. Fluctuations 
 
(σ=1,  φ=1, µ=0.50) 
Welfare Fluctuations
% of quarterly consumption








(σ=5,  φ=1, µ=0.50) 
Welfare Fluctuations
% of quarterly consumption








(σ=1,  φ=5, µ=0.50) 
Welfare Fluctuations
% of quarterly consumption
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000
-0.036
-0.024
-0.012
-0.000
0.012
0.024
 
 